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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SHIRLEY RODGERS, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
Case No. 15334 
v. 
ANNIE N. HANSEN and 
ALBERT J. HANSEN, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action to quiet title, under the doctrine of 
equitable mortgage, to property located at 412 North 300 West in 
Salt Lake City, more particularly described as follows: 
COMMENCING at a point 5 rods North of the 
Southwest corner of Lot 2, Block 121, Plat 
"A", Salt Lake City Survey, and running 
thence East 153 feet; thence North 2-1/2 
rods; thence West 153 feet; thence South 2-
1/2 rods to the place of beginning. 
Together with and subject to a right of way 
over: Commencing at a point 153 feet East of 
the Southwest corner of said Lot 2, and 
running thence North 10 rods; thence West 10 
feet; thence South 10 rods; thence East 10 
feet to the place of beginning. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to the court on September 23, 1976, 
with judgment being entered in favor of defendants on March 25, 
I 
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1977 (R. 123-124). The court dismissed plaintiff's complaint 
with prejudice and upon the merits and granted judgment for 
defendants on their counterclaim; title to a two-thirds inter'"' 
in the subject property was quieted in defendants and a trust~ 
impressed upon the one-third interest owned by plaintiff (Id.). 
On June 15, 1977, the court denied plaintiff's motion to set 
aside the judgment or, in the alternative, for a new trial (R. 
131). Plaintiff now appeals. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff/appellant seeks reversal of the judgment anc 
judgment in her favor as a matter of law or, that failing, a oc 
trial. In any event, plaintiff/appellant seeks a determination 
that, if the judgment should stand in all other respects, she i: 
entitled to a one-half interest in the subject property rather 
than to a one-third interest as found by the lower court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On April 25, 1942, William and Vivian Newsome enter~ 
into a Uniform Real Estate Contract (Ex. 1-P) with Harold and 
Myrtle Neil, the Neils agreeing to purchase from the Newsornes f:: 
$3,250.00 the property which is the subject matter of this litic 
tion. Although the receipts for the $400. 00 down payment (Ex. 
12-D) and for a number of the payments in the amount of $325.0C 
under the foregoing contract (Ex. 9-D) are made out to Haroldi 
Neil and/or Myrtle C. Neil, the defendants claimed and the cour: 
found (R. 110) that these payments were made by the defendants. 
Nevertheless, these payments were not in the nature of a busF,: 
-2-
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deal but rather were made by the defendants, the Neils' daughter 
and son-in-law, out of a feeling of love and family responsi-
bility (Tr. 78); repayment by Harold and Myrtle Neil was never 
discussed (Tr. 67, 78). The defendants have based no claim of an 
interest in this property upon these payments under the Uniform 
Real Estate Contract of 1942. 
Subsequent to entering into the real estate contract, 
Mr. Neil died in 1942 (R. 19-20). Apparently, Mrs. Neil experienced 
difficulty in providing the payments for the property and sought 
help from the Hansens. It is undisputed that the Hansens provided 
the funds to pay off the full amount due to the Newsomes under 
the real estate contract, $2,389.00 (See paragraph 2 of Stipula-
tion of September 22, 1976--R. 96), and that on July 7, 1944, the 
Newsomes executed a warranty deed (Ex. 2-P) conveying the subject 
property "to Myrtle C. Neil and Annie N. Hansen and Albert J. 
Hansen, her husband, as joint tenants and not as tenants in 
common." The significance of these actions, however, is in 
dispute. 
The Hansens maintain that they purchased outright a 
two-thirds interest in the property when making the $2,389 payment 
and that the reason for the joint tenancy wording was so that if 
one of the three should die the other two would still own the 
property (Tr. 72, 73). They claim that they made no loan to 
~rs. Neil (Tr. 87) and that they never agreed to reconvey their 
interest to her (Tr. 73, 88). Shirley Rodgers, the successor in 
interest to Mrs. Neil, however, contends that a loan and mortgage 
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arrangement was exactly what was anticipated by the parties; ~ 
other words, the deed absolute on its face was intended as a 
mortgage with Mrs. Neil taking taking title subject to the 
mortgage interest of the Newsomes. 
After the execution of the warranty deed, Mrs. Neil 
maintained sole possession of the property until she died on 
August 24, 1975 (Tr. 20). She paid the real property taxes (See 
Tr. 24-25 and Ex. 10-P) and also paid the maintenance and upkeef 
(See Tr. 26 and Ex. 11-P). Furthermore, she believed that the 
property, her home, was hers and that the arrangement of the 
names of the grantees on the warranty deed was very misleading 
(Tr. 30). 
Of even more importance, Mrs. Neil started making 
payments to the Han sens almost immediately. These payments are 
evidenced by a series of 43 receipts (Ex. 6-P) which bear the 
signature of and were executed by defendant Annie N. Hansen (See 
paragraph 3 of Stipulation of September 22, 1976--R. 96). T~H 
receipts all indicate that the payments they evidence were "hous; 
payments," often also indicating the address of the subject 
property. The first receipt in the series reflects a "Previous 
Balance" of $2,389. 00, the exact amount paid to the Newsomes, ar,: 
each of the payments reflect the amount paid being deducted tror, 
that figure which is then reduced to reflect a new "Balance D~ 
Although most of these receipts evidence payments of $25.00, man:· 
are for different amounts ranging from $7.50 to $70.00. Also, 
al though most of these receipts are to Myrtle Neil, the last W 
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beginning with an unnumbered receipt dated June 8, 1948, are to 
Myrtle Yeaman, reflecting the fact that she married one Nathan 
Thomas Yeaman in 1948 (Tr. 20). The final receipt in the series 
is dated August 5, 1949, and shows a balance then due to the 
Hansens from Mrs. Neil of $1,055.00. 
In 1958, apparently upset by a potential sale of the 
property arranged by the Hansens, Mrs. Neil contacted an attorney, 
Emmett L. Brown, who on September 29, 1958, wrote a letter to 
the Hansens (Ex. 13-P) in which he pointed out that Mrs. Neil had 
paid back a large amount of the money advanced by the Hansens. 
On September 30, 1958, Mrs. Hansen wrote a reply (Ex. 14-P) 
which, although generally incoherent, acknowledged receipt of 
payments by Mrs. Neil. 
On February 12, 1964, in an effort to destroy any 
possible joint tenancy that might have been construed under the 
aforementioned warranty deed (Tr. 29-30), Mrs. Neil conveyed by 
quitclaim deed (Ex. 4-P) all of her right, title, estate and 
interest in the subject property to her daughter Shirley Rodgers, 
the plaintiff/appellant. Mrs. Rodgers, on that same date, 
reconveyed by quitclaim deed (Ex. 3-P) the same right, title, 
estate and interest to Mrs. Neil. 
As noted above, Mrs. Neil considered the property hers 
and found the wording of the warranty deed misleading. This 
troubled her and was on her mind constantly, especially in the 
last seven to ten years of her life (Tr. 27, 47-48). In an 
effort to clear matters up she met with the Hansens at their home 
-5-
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in the sununer of 1968 (Tr. 30 et seq.). An effort was made at 
that meeting to determine the amount due to the Hansens in orde; 
that Mrs. Neil might clear up any title problem (Tr. 32-33). 
Even though the last receipt in 1949 had shown a balance due~ 
the property of $1, 055. 00, Mrs. Neil stated that she believed s:, 
owed only about $250, more or less, because she had not always 
received receipts when making payments (Tr. 33; see also Tr. 46i 
In answer, Mrs. Hansen stated that more than that was due (Tr. i: 
and Mr. Hansen indicated interest was due even though the orig~ 
agreement was for an interest-free loan (Tr. 34). Nothing, 
however, was resolved then (Tr. 34). 
After the 1968 meeting, Mrs. Neil did not institute an: 
legal proceedings because she was ill and did not wish to take 
her own daughter to court (Tr. 35). Instead, she executed a 
second quitclaim deed in favor of Mrs. Rodgers (Ex. 5-P) on 
May 21, 1971, so that she might eventually resolve the matter. 
The lower court ruled that Mrs. Rodgers did not take this intere' 
as an individual but rather as a trustee with the property or it' 
proceeds to be distributed by her in accordance with the will ci 
Mrs. Neil (Ex. 8-D) which was executed on May 10, 197 4. Plaint:: 
appellant does not dispute that such was her mother's intent. 
Mrs. Neil died on August 24, 1975. Within days aft~ 
the death of Mrs. Neil, the mother of both Shirley Rodgers and 
Annie Hansen, Mrs. Rodgers attempted to settle the question of 
title to the subject property with defendants. Unable to do~' 
plaintiff commenced this quiet title action by filing the comp: 
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(R. 2-4) on September 12, 1975, less than three weeks following 
the death of Mrs. Neil. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DECISION OF THE COURT, AS TO 
TITLE TO THE SUBJECT PROPERTY, 
IS CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE. 
This case is essentially to quiet title to the subject 
property in Shirley Rodgers based upon the fact that she holds 
title, as did her mother and predecessor in interest Myrtle C. 
Neil, subject only to an equitable mortgage in Annie and Albert 
Hansen. It is Mrs. Rodgers' contention that in 1944 the Hansens 
agreed to loan Mrs. Neil the money to pay off the Newsomes and 
acquire title to the subject property; that Mrs. Neil in turn 
agreed to secure repayment by listing the Hansens as joint 
tenants of the property until such time as she repaid the loan to 
them, and this in fact was done as reflected in the warranty deed 
of 1944 (Ex. 2-P). At all times, however, Mrs. Neil was to be 
considered the sole owner in fee simple of the property subject 
only to the lien held by the Hansens, with the relationship to be 
that of mortgagor and mortagees, not joint tenants. 
This contention by plaintiff is based in the concept of 
equitable mortgage. An equitable mortgage is not characterized 
by the standard legal niceties which one associates with a formal 
written legal mortgage filed at the County Recorder's office. In 
fact, an equitable mortgage need not even be evidenced by writing. 
Rather, an equitable mortgage is based upon the totality of the 
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transaction and is referable to the maxim that equity consider, 
that as done which ought to be done. 5 5 Am. Jur. 2d (<Jortgages § . 
at 200. 
The basic concepts of equitable mortgage can be fou~ 
in 59 C.J.S. Mortgages § 13 at 42-44, wherein it is stated: 
[G)enerally, whenever a transaction resolves 
itself into a security, or an offer or attempt 
to pledge land as security for a debt or 
liability, equity will treat it as a mortgage, 
without regard to the form it may assume, or 
the name the parties may choose to give it. 
In applying the doctrine of equitable mortgages 
doubts are resolved in favor of the transaction 
being a mortgage. 
In order that an equitable mortgage may 
exist it is essential that the mortgagor have 
a mortgageable interest in the property 
sought to be charged as security, and that 
there be clear proof of the sum which it was 
to secure. It is absolutely essential to its 
existence that there be a definite debt, 
obligation, or liability to be secured, due 
from the mortgagor to the mortgagee. It is 
not necessary, however, that the debt secured 
should be evidenced by notes, bonds, or any 
other written obligation or promise to pay. 
* * * 
. The doctrine of equitable mortgages 
has been held not to be limited to written 
instruments intended as mortgages, but to 
extend to a variety of parol transactions. 
Where equity and good conscience so require, 
such a mortgage may be found, even though no 
writing exists. 
The concept of equitable mortgage has been recognized in Utah, 
most notably in Bybee v. Stuart, 112 Utah 462, 468-69, 189 P.2ci 
118, 122 (1948), wherein it is stated: 
-8-
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It is true, of course, that a warranty deed, 
absolute in form, is presumed to convey a fee 
simple title, or at least whatever title the 
granter has. But where, as here, there is a 
written agreement between the parties, con-
temporaneous with the deed, which shows the 
deed to have been given for security purposes, 
the court will look to the real transaction 
and treat it as a mortgage. Brown v. Skeen, 
89 Utah 568, 58 P.2d 24. --
(I]n equity a deed absolute upon 
its face may be shown by a parol evidence to 
have been given for security purposes only, 
and when such a showing has been made, equity 
will give effect to the intention of the 
parties. Such security transactions, lacking 
the requisites of a formal mortgage, are 
termed equitable mortgages. 1 Jones on 
Mortgages, Chapter 5; Wasatch Min. Co. v. 
Jennins, 5 Utah 243, 251, 15 P. 65; Duerden v. 
Solomon, 33 Utah 468, 94 P. 978; Hess v. 
Anger, 53 Utah 186, 177 P. 232. See also 3 
Jones, Commentaries on Evidence, 2d Edition, 
page 2793, Section 1531. 
See also Taylor v. Turner, 27 Utah 2d 39, 43, 492 P.2d 1343, 1346 
(1972); Kjar v. Brimley, 27 Utah 2d 411, 497 P.2d 23 (1972). 
Admittedly, the cases in Utah which have involved an equitable 
mortgage dealt with a deed absolute on its face in which the 
granter himself wished to create a mortgagor-mortgagee, rather 
than granter-grantee, relationship and that is not the case here. 
However, as noted above, the concept extends to a variety of 
parol transactions, including advancing purchase money to one who 
is buying property and he, in turn, has the lender listed as 
grantee. This is set forth in 59 C.J.S. Mortgages § 14e. at 47 as 
follows: 
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If a person who has contracted for the 
purchase of land procures another to lend him 
all or part of the money necessary to make 
the payments, or to advance it for him, and 
has the deed made to the latter, with an agree-
ment that he will convey the title to the 
former on repayment of the amount advanced, 
the transaction will amount to an equitable 
mortgage if it was the understanding and intention 
of the parties that the one should become debtor 
to the other for the money advanced, and that 
the land should be held merely as security for 
this debt. 
Clearly, in light of the foregoing, it is the intent: 
the transaction, and not the use of "magic words" like "rnortgac; 
or "lien," that is important in determining the existence of an 
equitable mortgage. This is especially true in a case s~ch as 
this one where we are dealing with a transaction entered in~ 
by persons of limited education (Tr. 52-53). 
Therefore, if the evidence indicated a transaction 
between Mrs. Neil and the Hansens, as described above, an equit:: 
mortgage was created and Mrs. Neil took title in the prope:ty 
subject only to that equitable mortgage in the Hansens. 
The basic factors which needed to be shown to estabL 
that relationship, based on the principles cited above from 
C.J.S., were a mortgageable interest in the property and a 
definite debt secured by the property. The evidence clearly 
indicates that Hrs. Neil, at all relevant times, had an intere5• 
in the property, first under the 1942 real estate contract (E:(. 
1-P) and then under the 1944 warranty deed (Ex. 2-P). As far'' 
the debt is concerned, the series of 43 receipts (Ex. 6-P) 
amounted to clear and convincing evidence thereof and formed'. 
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backbone of appellant's case below. Contrary to his findings and 
conclusions, Judge Leary himself even indicated that these 
receipts evidenced payments from Mrs. Neil to the Hansens commenc-
ing almost contemporaneously with the execution of the warranty 
deed (Tr. 64). However, this Court need not be bound by any 
findings below as to these receipts. In Lake v. Hermes Associates, 
552 P. 2d 126, 128 (Utah 1976), it is stated: 
[W]here the resolution of the controversy 
depends upon meaning to be given documents, 
the trial court is in no more favored posi-
tion and is no better able to determine the 
meaning of such documents than is this court. 
Receipt number one, dated October 20, 1944, itself 
fairly well sets out the entire transaction. It indicates that 
the Hansens received a payment of $25.00 from Mrs. Neil '~For 
payment on house 415 N. 2nd West." It states the "Previous 
Balance"as $2,389, the exact amount paid to the Newsomes. The 
$25 payment is then deducted, leaving a "Balance Due" of $2,364, 
the exact amount which appears as the "Previous Balance" on 
receipt number two, dated November 29, 1944. The back of the 
first receipt also reflects the transaction, both with the 
Newsomes and between Mrs. Neil and the Hansens. In fact, it even 
indicates that the loan to Mrs. Neil was to be interest-free. 
Written on the back of the receipt is the following: 
Save 12.70 a month 
interest 
interest 12.70 
princible (sic] 12.30 
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In accordance with that, each payment reflected by the receipts 
is deducted in full from the amount listed as the previous 
balance. These receipts show that Mrs. Neil was making pa~eM! 
to the Hansens for the amount advanced to her by them and that 
they were acknowledging receipt of those payments and reducing 
the amount due from her. No other explanation can be made of 
these receipts, a fact recognized in the 1958 letter from Emet 
Brown to the Hansens (Ex. 13-P) in which he stated: 
As you are well aware, Mrs. Neil has paid you 
back out of this sum, approximately $1,100.00, 
and if it were your intent to have the two-
thirds interest in this home, it is hard to 
understand the basis upon which she would be 
paying you back that amount of money. 
No explanation by the Hansens was given to Mr. Bro~~ 
1958, other than Mrs. Hansen acknowledging: 
My Mother paid us when ever however she 
wanted 600.00 Between 1944 And 1948 No ques-
tions asked & she paid no interest. [See Ex. 
14-P.] 
Similarly, when her deposition was taken on November 10, 1976, 
Mrs. Hansen not only denied receiving payments from her mother 
but also denied ever giving her any receipts (See generally 
Transcript of Deposition of Annie N. Hansen at 11-13). And she 
specifically denied knowing what the purpose of said receipts," 
they existed, might be: 
Q If . your mother had made payments 
that were deducted from the balance of $2,389., 
do you know what purposes those payments would 
have been for? 
A I don't know. [Transcript of Deposition 
of Annie N. Hansen at 13.] 
-12-
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However, by the time Mrs. Hansen testified at the trial of this 
matter, she had developed an explanation. 
At trial, Mrs. Hansen testified that the receipts, the 
entire series, were part of an elaborate welfare fraud scheme 
(Tr. 85 et seq.). She claimed the receipts were given to "get 
money from the Welfare" (Tr. 86) and that they were for $25 in 
order to get a housing allowance in that amount (Tr. 91). 
However, she could not explain why certain receipts were for 
other amounts, such as $30, $7, $45 or $70 (Tr. 91, 92-94). 
Also, she claimed the receipts stopped in 1949 because her mother 
"got married to Thomas Yeaman" and could no longer receive the 
welfare housing allowance (Tr. 86), yet the last ten of the 
receipts, issued between June 8, 1948, and August 5, 1949, were 
made out to "Myrtle Yeaman" (See Ex. 6-P). 
Not only was Mrs. Hansen's story a complete surprise to 
Mrs. Rodgers and her counsel (Tr. 103) and ridiculously inconsis-
tent, it was evidence which could form no basis whatsoever for 
the lower court's decision. In 37 Am.Jur.2d Fraud and Deceit 
§ 301 at 397 it is stated as the general rule that: 
No one will be permitted in a court of justice 
to take advantage of, or claim protection by 
reason of, his own fraud 
Similarly, in Grover v. Garn, 23 Utah 2d 441, 447, 464 P.2d 598, 
602 (1970), it is stated: 
(U]nder the doctrine or principle of estoppel 
in pais o~e may by his acts or conduct away 
from the court prevent himself from denying 
in court the effect or result of those acts. 
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Clearly, the Han sens cannot hope to profit from what 
they assert was a fraud upon the state. They cannot admit to 
Emmett Brown that Mrs. Neil made payments to them on the house 
and even deny under oath the very existence of these receipts~ 
then come into court and claim that no payments were made and 
that the receipts were only the device by which they helped 
perpetrate a welfare fraud. The Hansens must be bound by the 
inferences to be drawn from these receipts. Those inferences ar-
that they made an interest-free loan to Mrs. Neil, in order~~ 
she might acquire title to the subject property, which loan ns 
secured by the property itself, and that she made payments to 
them on the loan, at least 43 of which are evidenced by the 
receipts themselves. No other reasonable explanation can be 
derived from the evidence presented to the lower court which 
erred in ruling as it did. 
POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE 
STATUTE OF FRAUDS WAS APPLICABLE 
TO THIS CASE. 
The lower court erroneously concluded this action was: 
case in the nature of specific performance of an agreement to 
sell the Hansens' interest in the subject property to Mrs. NeE 
and that such an agreement violates the statute of frauds, ~ 
Code Annotated § 25-5-1 (1976) (R. 113) in that the receipts (Ex 
6-P) were insufficient to take the alleged agreement out of t~ 
statute of frauds, either as a written memorandum or under the 
doctrine of part performance (R. 114). This conclusion clearl; 
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is erroneous because, as noted above, the doctrine of equitable 
mortgages is not limited to written instruments but rather 
extends to a variety of parol transactions even though no writing 
exists. 59 C.J.S. Mortgages § 13 at 43-44. In other words, the 
law says an equitable mortgage may be found even though no writing 
exists. Nevertheless, the court said no equitable mortgage could 
be found because there was no writing. Furthermore, under the 
doctrine of equitable mortgage, Mrs. Neil was the sole owner of 
the property and the Hansens had no interest, as either joint 
tenants or tenants in common, to sell to her. Therefore, Mrs. Neil 
could not have entered into a contract to buy the Hansens' 
"interest" from them and the transaction, from its inception, was 
outside the statute of frauds. 
Assuming, arguendo, that the statute of frauds could·be 
considered applicable to this transaction, the receipts (Ex. 6-P) 
taken together should be a sufficient writing. They indicate the 
amount to be paid, starting in 1944 at $2,389.00 and being 
reduced each time a payment was made by the full amount paid. 
They clearly are denoted as "house payments" often also including 
the address to indicate exactly which house. Both the indication 
on the back of receipt number one and the fact that the full 
amount paid was deducted each time from the previous balance 
reflect the fact the loan was interest-free. Finally, they are 
all signed by Annie N. Hansen, the party to be bound. 
Assuming further that this is still not sufficient to 
take this transaction out of the statute of frauds, the receipts 
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surely show part performance sufficient to take the transacti:: 
out of the statute. And part performance will, in a si tuatiori 
like this, avoid the statute of frauds. In re Madsen's Estat~ 
123 Utah 316, 340, 259 P.2d 595, 601 (1953). Clearly, the 
receipts indicate "house payments" being made over the course:. 
almost five years under the terms outlined above. 
POINT III 
THE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT 
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM WAS BARRED BY 
BOTH STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS 
AND THE DOCTRINE OF LACHES. 
Plaintiff/appellant maintains that her quiet title-
equitable mortgage action was not barred either by any statute· 
limitations, if it might be construed as a legal action, or by 
the doctrine of laches. Nevertheless, the lower court concluc:. 
that both were applicable (R. 114) . To find either applicable 
to this case is baffling; to find both applicable is clearly 
contradictory. 
To find statutes of limitations applicable in this 
particular case overlooks the fact that a quiet title action i; 
basically equitable and, therefore, not barred by any statute:: 
limitations. Furthermore, it overlooks the fact that the unde: 
lying theory here, that of equitable mortgage, is also obvi~~ 
equitable and not subject to statutes of limitations. Finau;·, 
the specific statutes of limitations found by the lower court~ 
apply, Utah Code Annotated §§ 78-12-25 and 78-12-26(3), seem: 
be curiously inappropriate. Admittedly, § 78-12-25(2) covers 
"(a] n action for relief not otherwise provided for by law" ar.c 
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there is no limitation statute directly applicable to either a 
quiet title or equitable mortgage action. Nevertheless, those 
are real property actions and the entire of Article 1 to Chap-
ter 12 of Title 78 (Utah Code Annotated §§ 78-12-2 to 78-12-21) 
relates to limitations in real property actions, but the court 
did not find any of these applicable. Likewise, actions based in 
fraud and mistake are the essence of § 78-12-26(3) and plaintiff/ 
appellant has never claimed fraud or mistake to be applicable 
here. 
If either of the bars to an action, limitations or 
laches, is appropriate here, it would have to be laches since 
this is clearly an equitable action. However, it has been held 
in Jacobs v. Perry, 135 Colo. 550, 313 P.2d 1008, 1012 (1957), 
that laches is not even available as a defense in a quiet title 
action. Assuming, arguendo, that laches could be available here: 
at 703: 
The question whether the suit is barred 
by reason of laches is not to be determined 
by reference to any particular period as 
compared with the time during which the 
complainant delayed seeking to quiet his 
title. In this respect, a solution of the 
question as to laches vel non depends upon 
the circumstances of the case. (65 Am.Jur.2d 
Quieting Title § 57 at 188.) 
Furthermore, it is stated at 27 Am.Jur.2d Equity § 163 
Lapse of time, although manifestly an 
important consideration in determining 
whether relief will be barred in equity 
because of laches, is not of itself decisive. 
That is to say, lapse of time is only one, 
and, moreover, not ordinarily the controlling 
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or most important one, of the elements to be 
considered in determining the exercise and 
application of laches as a defense in a suit 
of equity. (M]ere delay in the asser-
tion of a claim does not, of itself, amount 
to laches. This is obviously so where the 
complainant can show an excuse for his failure 
to seek relief more promptly. So, generally, 
the fact that the complainant has delayed to 
bring suit will not alone be held to have 
barred him of relief. 
Among the facts and circumstances to be considered in 
determining whether laches is applicable is the relationship of 
the parties, 27 Am.Jur.2d Equity § 162 at 702, and especially 
intimate or confidential relations, Id. § 165 at 707. 
It is noteworthy that the plaintiff and defendant Ann: 
Hansen are sisters and that Mrs. Neil, plaintiff's predecessM~ 
title, was their mother. It is pointed out in Major v. Shaver, 
187 F.2d 211, 212 (D.C.Cir. 1951): 
[I]n considering questions of laches, the 
utmost leniency is manifested by the courts 
where it appears that the delay is due to the 
intimate personal relations existing between 
the parties and the high degree of confidence 
reposed by one in another. In such case, and 
especially when a family relation exists, the 
same degree of diligence is seldom required. 
Likewise, another excuse for delay is when the plaintiff is in 
possession of the subject property under claim of title. See JC 
C.J.S. Equity§ 116 at 62; 74 C.J.S, Quieting Title § 49 at 70; 
27 Am.Jur.2d Equity § 165 at 708. The same is true of statutes 
of limitations. It is stated in Viersen v. Boettcher, 387 P.2d 
133, 138 (Okla. 1963): 
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[A]n action to quiet title, where the plain-
tiff has been in continuous possession of 
property, claiming ownership therein, can be 
maintained at any time, and no statute of 
limitation bars his right to the relief 
sought. 
Admittedly, Shirley Rodgers has not herself been in continuous 
possession of the property. However, her predecessor in title, 
her mother, was in continuous possession of the property until 
her death (Tr. 20), less than three weeks before the filing of 
the instant case. It is significant that Mrs. Neil, especially 
during her last years, was quite ill and did not wish to sue her 
own daughter (Tr. 35). Clearly, the family relationship of the 
Hansens, Mrs. Rodgers and Mrs. Neil, as well as Mrs. Neil's 
continuous possession of the property, provide an excuse for 
passage of time without instituting suit. 
It also is stated in Mary Jane Stevens Co. v. First 
National Building Co., 89 Utah 456, 515, 57 P.2d 1099, 1125 
(1936), that laches is not a matter of mere delay but rather 
involves standing by watching one change his position. Likewise, 
in Mawhinney v. Jensen, 120 Utah 142, 148-49, 232 P.2d 769 
(1951), it is stated: 
The equitable doctrine of laches is 
founded upon considerations of time and 
injury. 
"Laches in legal significance is 
not mere delay, but delay that works a 
disadvantage to another." Pomeroy's 
Equity Jurisprudence, 4th Ed. § 1442; 
Chase v. Chase, 20 R.I. 202, 37 A. 804. 
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. The question of laches can only 
be determined under the circumstances of each 
case and there must be a finding that the 
delay has inequitably prejudiced the defen-
dant before the remedy is barred. 
Likewise, in Flora v. Gusman, 76 Idaho 188, 279 P.2d 1067 (19:: 
which discusses at length the factors which mitigate applicat~ 
of the doctrine of laches, it is stated: 
[T]he defense of laches does not apply where 
unnecessary to protect adverse party from 
being placed in worse condition than he would 
have been had action been prosecuted with 
greater diligence; and . circumstances of 
each case must govern courts of equity in 
permitting defense of laches to be made. 
[279 P.2d at 1072.] 
The lower court did conclude that the Hansens suffer;. 
prejudice to their case because of passage of time and "by v~: 
of their expenditure of money for the property in the belief ti.: 
they had a clear unencumbered right thereto." ( R. 114 ) Howev;: 
this is totally at var"-ance with the facts of this case. Firs: 
of all, the loss of the "star witness," Mrs. Neil, clearly 
prejudiced Mrs. Rodgers' case more than the Hans ens'. Second!; 
the Hansens' unsubstantiated claims to having expended large ;;: 
of money, allegedly in improving the property, and that they 
performed maintenance and upkeep on the property should be 
considered completely insufficient to establish any monetary 
detriment. 
The sum total of their claims is that they helped 
finance repair of the front porch and the building of a room:: 
the back (R. 74) although no figures were given, that they ga' 
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~rs. Neil money, in an unspecified amount, to help pay taxes 
without ever knowing how it was spent (Tr. 74-75), and that some 
plumbing and electrical work was done (Tr. 75). This hardly 
amounts to hard proof any expenditures were even made or to some 
form of detrimental reliance. Even assuming that such payments 
were made and such repairs performed, it must be remembered that 
Mrs. Neil was the mother and mother-in-law of the defendants. It 
would seem odd indeed if one would refuse to assist his or her 
mother unless some claim to her property was involved. Very 
little significance should be attached to efforts at helping a 
widowed mother keep her home in repair and property taxes up to 
date, especially in the instant case in view of the fact that 
other family members often chipped in to help in similar ways 
financially (Tr. 25-26). 
Also, it is undisputed that defendants claim that 
Mrs. Neil had a duty to pay taxes and a right to use the property 
for the duration of her life (R. 73). Therefore, they have not 
been placed in any worse condition than if the suit had been 
brought earlier. Assuming the validity of their claims, they 
would not have come into possession of the property until after 
the death of their mother and this suit was brought within three 
weeks after that occurrence. 
Clearly, both the doctrine of laches and statutes of 
limitations were totally inappropriate in this case and did not 
constitute a bar to the action. 
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POINT IV 
THE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT 
PLAINTIFF WAS ENTITLED TO ONLY 
A ONE-THIRD INTEREST IN THE SUBJECT 
PROPERTY RATHER THAN A ONE-HALF 
INTEREST. 
Assuming, arguendo, that plaintiff/appellant should nc· 
prevail on the main thrust of her appeal for a reversal of the 
judgment or a new trial, she still should be entitled to a one-
half share of the subject property rather than the one-third 
interest found by the lower court. This is so because of sound 
common law principles of construction of deeds. 
The warranty deed of 1944 (Ex. 2-P) covering the 
subject property was executed by William and Vivian Newsome ·~ 
Myrtle C. Neil and Annie N. Hansen and Albert J. Hansen, her 
husband, as joint tenants and not as tenants in common." Assum: 
this deed establishes the ownership of the subject property, 
Mrs. Rodgers, as successor in interest to Myrtle C. Heil, shoulC 
take a one-half interest in the property and the Hansens takeG 
other one-half interest. This is based first upon the general 
rule that a conveyance to three people, two of whom are husband 
and wife, results in the husband and wife taking one half of~ 
estate and the third party taking the other half of the estate. 
This rule is based upon the common law presumption that a conve: 
ance to a husband and wife results in the two persons taking as 
one, since the common law viewed a married couple as one persor 
That principle carries over into the situation, as in the insti: 
case, when property is conveyed to a husband and wife and so~ 
third person: 
-22-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Where property is conveyed or devised to 
husband and wife and a third person or 
persons, the husband and wife, being one 
person in law, will together take only an 
undivided moiety or half of the estate, 
leaving the other half to the third person . 
. . As between themselves, husband and wife 
are tenants by entirety of their share, but 
as to third persons they are together a joint 
tenant or tenant in common with him. (41 
C.J.S. Husband and Wife § 3l(f) at 454.] 
The essence of this first basis for contending appellant 
is entitled to one half rather than one third of the subject 
property is the common law concept of tenancy by the entirety and 
tenancy by the entirety exists in Utah. Admittedly, there are no 
cases from this Court recognizing its existence, but there like-
wise are no cases abolishing it. Therefore, it must exist 
because it is a common law concept and the common law is specifi-
cally adopted in Utah unless abrogated by statute, Utah Code 
Annotated § 68-3-1 (1968). Similarly, there is no statute 
specifically establishing tenancy by the entirety in Utah, but 
there is no statute abolishing or abrogating this common law 
concept. More importantly in the area of statutory law, three 
separate statutes implicitly recognize tenancy by the entirety by 
mentioning it: Utah Code Annotated § 78-41-1 (1977), on termina-
tion of life estates, recognizes the existence of "tenancy by the 
entirety." Utah Code Annotated § 75-2-1003 (Supp. 1977) [formerly 
§ 74-5-3], a section of the Simultaneous Death Act, refers to 
"tenants by the entirety." This provision was re~nacted by the 
Legislature only two years ago when the Probate Code was revamped. 
1975 Utah Laws, ch. 150, § 3. Finally, Utah Code Annotated § 48-
-23-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1-4 (2) (1970), a section of the Partnership Act, states that 
"tenancy by entireties . does not of itself establish a 
partnership." 
Appellant's position is also based on the precise 
manner of stating the conveyance as, in essence, "to A and B a~~ 
C, her husband," rather than "to A!.... Band C, her husband." 
Because of the use of the word "and" rather than a comma be twee:. 
the name of Mrs. Neil and the husband and wife unit of the 
Hans ens, it is clear that Mrs. Neil was treated as one separate 
unit and the Hansens as a second. In that instance, each unit 
receives one half of the property conveyed. 
The case of Eeatter v. Lucas, 367 Pa. 296, 80 A.2d 74~ 
(1951), illustrates each of these premises for plaintiff's 
contention. The Heatter case involves a deed to "Francis Lucas, 
a single man, and Joseph Lucas and Matilda Lucas, his wife." 
There is no indication in the clause as to what estate each par: 
takes. Nevertheless, this case is important because it constne 
the significance of the phrase "his wife" and the importance of 
employing the conj unction "and," instead of using a comma, when 
delineating the grantees. The court first noted that a convey~ 
to three parties, two of whom are married but not designated as 
such, shall normally be deemed a conveyance of one third of the 
estate to each party. Then the court distinguished the case 
under consideration stating: 
Here the conveyance is to "Francis 
Lucas, a single man, and Joseph Lucas and 
Matilda Lucas, his wife." The words "his 
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wife" cannot be treated as mere surplusage; 
they occur in context in the classic form for 
the creation of the tenancy by the entirety. 
The parties must be taken to have considered 
and given significance to the marital status 
of two of the grantees. 
In the instant case the two grantees are 
in fact husband and wife, and the designation 
"his wife" sufficiently imports an intention 
that they shall take as such. Further, the 
conjunction "and," here used, is unnecessary 
if the parties were intended to take undivided 
one third parts; the use of the word "and" 
has separated the grantees into two units (1) 
Francis and (2) Joseph and Matilda. (80 A.2d 
at 752.] 
Finally, the court noted that there was no restraint forbidding 
the creation of a joint tenancy or tenancy in common where one 
part of the tenancy was a combination of the husband and wife as 
tenants by the entirety. 
The Heatter case goes right to the heart of the objec-
tions raised below by the defendants that, because Utah Code 
Annotated § 57-1-5 (1974) requires the interests of joint tenants 
to be equal and undivided, each of the Hansens is entitled to one 
third of the estate. Clearly, as noted above, this might well 
be the case when the married couple is not designated as such. 
However, here they are designated as a married couple and the 
words "her husband" cannot be treated as "mere surplusage." 
Furthermore, as in Heatter, there is no restraint, even in § 57-
1-S, forbidding the creation of a joint tenancy or tenancy in 
common between a single person as one tenant and a husband-wife 
tenancy by the entirety as another tenant. 
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Likewise, the case of In re Buttnow, 4 9 Misc. 2d 445, 
267 N.Y.S. 2d 740 (1966), involved a deed to "Anelia M. Bakowsk, 
widow, and Josephine Katherine Buttnow, married to Alexander M. 
Buttnow, married to Josephine Katherine, jointly, all of Port 
Jefferson Station, Long Island, New York." The court found t~t 
husband and wife received a one-half interest in the estate, but 
as tenants in the entirety, and that the third party, Anelia 
Bakowski, received the other half of the estate, as tenant in 
common to the husband and wife. It was noted that the critical 
factor in determining the meaning of the phrase in question is 
the "intent of the parties as manifested by the language of the 
deed." The court felt that the designation of the Buttnows as 
husband and wife was indicative of the grantor's intention to 
convey to them a tenancy by the entirety. The court held that 
such a designation was probative of such an intent. The court 
also noted that the separation of the estates to 1'.nelia Bakowski 
and the husband and wife by the word "and" indicated an intenUo: 
by the grantor to apply the term "jointly" only to the husband 
and wife. 
The case of Daniel v. Wright, 352 F.Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 
1972), dealt with a deed "to Herbert L. Wright and Mattie G. 
Wright, his wife, and Pauline E. Liner ... as Joint Tenants." 
The court noted that the term "Joint Tenants" appears to modif) 
all of the three names involved. However, the court awarded a 
one-half interest to the Wrights and the other one-half interesc 
to Ms. Liner. In the District of Columbia a conveyance to a 
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husband and wife as joint tenants creates a tenancy by the 
entirety and the court rested its decision on that principle, 
essentially that the Wrights, as a married couple, took only one 
half as one person. 
Also, the opinion in Mosser v. Dolsay, 132 N.J. Eq. 
121, 27 A.2d 155 (1942), interprets a granting clause similar in 
nature to the one in the instant case, which states: 
[To] Ralph Mosser of the Burough of Wanaque, 
County of Passaic, and State of New Jersey, 
and Frank Dolsay and Emma Dolsay, his wife, 
as joint tenants and not as tenants in common, 
with rights of survivorship incident thereto. 
The court, quoting Freeman on Co-tenancy and Partition 
§ 70, stated: 
The husband and wife not only take an 
entire estate as one person when it is granted 
to them, but they are also regarded as one 
person in any conveyance made to them and 
others, and therefore take but one moiety. 
Thus, if a deed be made to A and wife and B, 
here A and wife take together but one-half. 
This is true whether the conveyance be intended 
to create a joint-tenancy or a tenancy in 
common. [ 27 A. 2d at 157.] 
In summary, should Mrs. Rodgers, as successor to Myrtle 
Neil, take only the interest Mrs. Neil took in the warranty deed 
from the Newsomes, without regard to any other factors present in 
this case, she should take a one-half interest. The two basic 
reasons for this are: First, a conveyance to a husband and wife 
is a conveyance to one person and, therefore, a conveyance to a 
husband and wife and another person is a conveyance of a one-half 
interest to the husband and wife as one person and a one-half 
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interest to the other person. This position is strengthened 
where the grantor explicitly notes the marital status of the 
parties. Second, use of the conjunction "and," instead of a 
comma, between the name of a third person and the names of the 
married couple in a deed is presumptive evidence that the parti:· 
were not intended to take three equal interests in the estate k 
rather two. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant respectfully submits that the decision of tr 
trial court was totally contrary to the clear and convincing 
evidence that Myrtle C. Neil took title to the subject property 
as sole fee owner in 1944 subject only to the equitable mortgage 
of the Hansens. Further, when Mrs. Neil quitclaimed her intern: 
to appellant Shirley Rodgers in 1971, Mrs. Rodgers in turn becarr: 
the sole fee owner. Therefore the judgment of the lower court 
must be reversed and judgment entered for appellant or a new 
trial must be granted. 
Appellant further submits that her claim is not barrec 
by any of the technical defenses raised by the Hansens--statute 
of frauds, statute of limitations, or laches--and that the court· 
erred in applying them. 
Finally, appellant submits that, in the event this 
Court finds for respondents on each of the above issues, she 
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--
still is entitled to a one-half interest in the subject property 
rather than the one-third interest awarded by the trial court. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 20th day of October, 1977. 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
A copy of the foregoing Appellant's Brief was mailed, 
postage prepaid and properly addressed, -to Steven H. Gunn, of and 
for Ray, Quinney & Nebeker, attorneys for respondents, 400 Deseret 
Building, 79 South Main Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this 
20th day of October, 1977. 
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